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|
Philosophy of Language in Classical China
Philosophy of Language in Classical
China
Confucius: Rectifying Names
Mo Tzu: language utilitarianism
Later Mohist Realism
The School of Names: Kung-sun Lung and Hui Shih
Chuang Tzu: Skeptical Relativism
Hsün Tzu: Confucian Conventionalism
The Aftermath: Death of Philosophy
Glossary (In Big 5 coding)
Reading List
Theory of language is a key part of Classical
Chinese thought. It provided the crucial insights that informed the original,
indigenous philosophy of China. It shaped their discussions of metaphysics,
moral psychology, normative and applied ethics and political theory. Classical
debates about language produced progressively more viable theories whose surprising
distinctiveness reflects features of Chinese language.
This article will address only these Pre-Han
theorists whose distinctively Chinese theories triggered the philosophical high
point of classical philosophy. Crudeness in linguistic theory stands as one
of clearest signs of the philosophical "Dark Age" that followed. The
break in transmission of reflective analysis accompanied the substitution of
superstitious and manipulative religious cosmology for philosophy. Buddhism
introduced a Western theory which, stirred loosely into the crude remnant, produced
the Medieval Chinese linguistic doctrines. A countervailing trend produced a
scholastic Confucianism that dominated Chinese thinking until early modern times.
Buddhism imported its peculiar version
of the familiar Indo-European theory of language and mind (sententials, concept
theory, and private mind idealism). How well they understood this and how influential
it was in China are both controversial. See various articles under Buddhism
for more discussion. Buddhism, in turn, influenced the Neo-Confucian revival
but it failed to develop an independent theory of language. Neo-Confucianism
reflected some of Buddhism's anti-language posture, but with little sustained
reflection either on language itself or on the problems that classical philosophers
exposed in anti-language positions.
The original Chinese theories presuppose
many interesting background assumptions about language. First, they seldom remarked
on the use of written characters--probably regarding these as a normal way of
writing. Their use did not incline writers to draw strong distinctions between
writing and speaking. Key terms like ming (names) and yan
(language:words) seem to function much as our English translations do,
i.e., referring to abstract types of which both written or spoken items
are tokens. Modern Chinese distinguishes between wen (literature)
and hua (speech).
Despite the pictographic derivation of
written Chinese, all classical thinkers tended to treat reference as a matter
of historical-convention. Ideally, we conform to the practice of the hypothetical
coiners of names (Sage kings). Paradoxically, no philosopher seems even to have
formulated a representational picture of how language operates. A representational
theory would seem natural given a pictographic view of writing. However, would
dealing with written symbols, rather than idealized mental images tempt them
less to propose a pictographic semantics?
Two things might suggest so: 1) anyone
who learned to write would appreciate that it required conformity to conventional
form; not any picture, however accurate, would do; 2) the conventional symbols
do not resemble their objects in ways that allow direct interpretation without
learning the conventions.
Chinese theory also differs from Western
sentential "picture theory." They did not understand sentences as
true when they "pictured" analogously structured metaphysical
facts. Chinese linguistic thought focused on names not sentences. We
can easily explain this different preoccupation. The vivid, graphic writing
focuses attention on the character units. More importantly, characters did not
take part-of-speech modification. Chinese writers did not notice the functional
parts that point to sentential composition. Further, in their topic-comment
structure, subjects were optional and comparatively rare in written texts. The
familiar Western idea of a sentence "frame" that speakers "fill
in" with functional units would not be as inviting for Chinese linguistic
thinkers.
Those features explain adequately the focus
on words rather than sentential units, but not the companion treatment of all
words as ming (names). Again, this is an assumption made more natural
by a feature of Chinese. Chinese common nouns are not only unmarked for singular
and plural, but also, like proper nouns (and mass nouns), they stand alone as
noun phrases. Although grammatically dividing reference, common noun use was
developing reliance on counting sortals. Sortal counting had become standard
by the Han Dynasty.
The ideograph translated most commonly
in metaphysical formulations as "thing" (wu) yields more plausible
claims when translated as "thing-kind." The implicit metaphysics is
a part-whole, mereological structure. Thinkers associate 'names' with ways of
making distinctions rather than with reference to particulars.
This explains the anomaly of treating all
terms as 'names,' but fails to explain the similar treatment of adjectives
and verbs. Lack of function marking is again part of a possible explanation.
Adjectives used in nominal position did not undergo abstract inflection so theorists
treated 'red' and 'gold' as analogous. They could associate descriptive adjectives,
like mass nouns, with a range or "extension" and view adjectival "names"
as distinguishing one range from others. The ranges distinguished by different
"names" can overlap. In those cases, they would use compound "names."
Distinguishing between the ways adjectives and nouns worked in compounds produced
puzzles for pre-Han theorists. (See Later Mohists)
One place verbs and verbs with ergative
transformations were enough like adjectives to yield to analogous treatment.
A pattern of using both nouns and adjectives as two-place verbs further reduced
any "felt" differences between transitive verbs and substantives.
This use replaced belief-contexts. They could express "X believes S is
P as X P-s S or as X, using S, deems it P. The natural way of construing the
former verb is as a "quote verb." People use the name of the contextually
identified stuff; classify or distinguish it into the category of P-stuff.
We should note that we can now identify grammatical distinctions (word order,
admissible combinations with other words and particles, etc.) between common
and proper nouns, between terms and adjectives, and verbs. My argument is that
the implicit ancient Chinese analysis is understandable (not blatantly naive)
but not that it is correct.
Another shared assumption is harder to explain. The only explanation is that
the view is intuitively as plausible as the contrary assumption that drives
much of Western theory of language. Chinese thinkers view language pragmatically.
They emphasize the social role--guiding and coordinating group behavior over
the descriptive, fact-stating role. The view also fits the background goal of
conforming to the intentions of the sage kings. They were moral exemplars and
social engineers as well as language "inventors." They formulated
the code of behavior (li (rites)). This assumption also reflects the
most important known pre-historic use of writing in China, guidance by divination.
The earliest forms of Chinese characters known are found on oracle bones unearthed
by archeologists. Chinese priests used these then "stored" as an accumulated
dao or guide.
Confucius: Rectifying names.
We notice this last feature of Chinese theory of language first in Confucius'
"rectifying names." Confucius studied and taught a historical discourse
which he attributed to the sage kings. Central among the ancient documents that
formed the curriculum of his school was The Book of Ritual--the traditionalist
Confucian conception of ethics. Confucius addressed mainly problems in practical
interpretation with his students. Studying with Confucius meant learning to
do the rites correctly, e.g., wear the right hat at the right time in the right
ceremony. His theory reflected the pragmatic relation between language and objects.
In order for the traditional discourse to guide us, we must correctly pin its
"names" on the world’s "stuff."
Confucius assumed we learn this ability
to discriminate by imitation. Teacher-actors model the use of names for us in
the course of performing rituals. We extrapolate from these examples in following
the code as it applies to us. Confucius called this ‘rectifying names’ and treated
it as the key to good government:
Zilu said, ‘The ruler of Wei awaits your
taking on administration. What would be master's priority?’ The master replied,
‘Certainly--rectifying names!’ . . . . If names are not rectified then language
will not flow. If language does not flow, then affairs cannot be completed.
If affairs are not completed, ritual and music will not flourish. If ritual
and music do not flourish, punishments and penalties will miss their mark. When
punishments and penalties miss their mark, people lack the wherewithal to control
hand and foot. Hence a gentleman's words must be acceptable to vocalize and
his language must be acceptable as action. A gentleman's language lacks anything
that misses--period.(13:3)
Confucius here focused on the relation
between language and action, not that between language and objects. His strategy
of setting examples threatens a vicious regress in two ways. First, someone
in the chain of models must know in some other way what example to set
(supposedly the sage king). Second, the example itself requires interpretation
in extrapolating it to new states of affairs. Confucian intuitionism was the
main way of blocking these regresses. Confucius seemed to regard a mysterious
quality, ren (humanity), as the key to correct practical interpretation
of the ritual. Humanity is a moral insight that guides the attribution
of terms in specific circumstances–guides us in rectifying names..
Notice the absence of definitions in his
account. Chinese accounts of language are unswervingly extensional. They rarely
invoke any concept such as ‘meaning’, 'idea' or 'concept'. The language-world
relation is a political matter. Social authorities tag things for the purpose
of guiding discourse. Accordingly, two rival Confucian theories of tagging emerge:
one relies on tradition and the other on an innate moral intuition.
We see traces of grammatical topic-comment
structure in Confucius’ doctrine. In the place of sentences, describing states
of affairs, Literary Chinese attaches "names" to relevant stuff (comments
on topics). The topics are typically contextual and Chinese thinkers are sensitive
to the context-dependence of language. They rarely reflect on free-standing
utterances detached from a social moral context. Chinese linguistic theory focused
on the question of what term to assign to things rather than on what the propositional
units are true or accurate pictures of reality.
Mozi: language utilitarianism
The natural development of this model (arguably
its source, since the dating of the "rectify names" passage is controversial)
comes in the work of Confucius' first critic, the utilitarian philosopher Mozi.
His early work (and the subsequent elaboration in Later Mohism) focuses on bian
(distinctions). A term's use involves a way to shi (is this/right) and
to fei (is not this/wrong) in using it. To learn the term is thus to
learn to shi/fei appropriately with it. Mozi argued that society
should use the pre-conventional or natural ‘will’ toward benefit (and against
harm) to guide its shi/fei practice for the words used in social
discourse. This initial interpretive proposal turned into a proposal to order
the words in guiding discourse differently, i.e., to change Confucius' traditional
dao (guide).
Mozi's arguments about spirits and fate
clarify how this works. General utility, he argued, favors a social discourse
with the string wu-ming (lack fate) and you-shen (have spirits).
He represents this conclusion about strings as an example of knowing the dao
of you-wu (have/lack). That means making a shi/fei (is this/is
not this) distinction for you/wu using the benefit/harm distinction as
our guide. We use (have) or (lack) of things when doing so will lead to general
utility.
The implication of Mozi's line of analysis
was initially anti-realistic. Mozi advocated three standards of language use.
The first acknowledged the historical, conventional aspect of language. Our
discourse should conform to the guiding intentions of the ancient Sage Kings.
Second, language standards should be appropriate for use by ordinary people
using their ‘eyes and ears.’ One hypothesis is this means that standards of
correct use should be objectively accessible, like measurement standards. Mozi's
illustrations include a plumb line, a compass, a square, and stakes for plotting
where the sun rises and sets. Finally, we should use words in ways that maximize
general utility.
Mozi probably supposed these standards
pull in essentially the same direction. He assumed the people's well-being motivated
the sage kings and clear standards promote general utility. The utility criterion
itself was an example of an objective standard. First, it was the ‘will of nature’
not the product of a particular conventional history, and it was measurement-like.
These standards govern the content and
practice of discourse, regulations, injunctions, maxims and slogans. Including
any string in the proposed ideal social guiding discourse was ‘making it constant.’
The ideal of a constant discourse dao was of one that could consistently
(reliably) and correctly (objectively) guide society. Mozi identified that dao
as the one that resulted in the greatest utility for the country and its people.
Thus assignment of names was a handmaiden to ethics.
To count as the constant dao, Mozi’s
benefit/harm standard must itself be constant. It should be a reliable, unambiguous,
and objectively correct, unchanging distinction. He alleged that since it came
from tian "nature" rather than from society, convention or
contingent history, it was all of these.
Mozi’s attack on conventional guiding discourse
led Mencius to defend Confucianism by postulating an innate moral intuition
that carried anti-language implications. Mencius argued that language should
not manipulate or guide human action. Guidance should only come from the innate
patterns or dispositions in the heart-mind. These include an innate ability
to shi/fei "is this/is not this" in situations of action choice.
The heart-mind selects the appropriate assignment and thus the appropriate behavior.
Social language should not distort or reshape those natural moral inclinations.
Mencius' argument presupposed that, left to itself, our heart-mind would innately
select the correct action for us.
The Laozi also took a negative view of language, but its pragmatic
analysis of the effects of language undermined Mencius’ optimism about innate
moral psychology. Laozi agrees that we should resist the conventional
socialization that comes with language. Learning names means learning one arbitrary
way of making distinctions. We also learn to guide our action by making these
distinctions. Laozi interprets this as acquiring or changing our desires.
Thus acquiring a language constrains our natural spontaneity and creates new,
disruptive and usually competitive desires.
Laozi implicitly portrayed natural (pre-linguistic) behavior as much more ‘primitive’
than did Mencius. Few of our desires are innate instinct. Most are learned.
Learning names involves training in how to make distinctions and how to ‘desire’
with them. The names, distinctions, desires and conventional actions are linked
distortions of natural spontaneity. Absent linguistic embellishment, the natural
desires would sustain social concerns that extend no farther than the local
agrarian village.
The Laozi highlights the anti-language aspect of intuitive guidance
more than did Mencius. It suggests that Mencius’ idea (that the Confucian moral
values in particular were natural) was a result of confusing the unconscious
result of learning a guiding language with native intuition. The conventional
patterning of distinctions and desires is arbitrary. He makes this point in
arguing that we can reverse most conventional values. Laozi’s conclusion
is his opening line--no guiding discourse is constant.
Later Mohist Realism
Followers of the school
of Mozi emphasized theory of language and formulated the most realistic and
sophisticated theory of language of the period. Here we mainly summarize their
conclusions.
They taught that although language could
itself be a source of information, it works only when it shadows objective similarities
and differences in reality. They failed to produce a satisfactory account of
how objective features guided language distinctions. They did, however, note
differences in scope between particular names (John), species terms (horse),
and very general terms (thing) and distinguished several types
of similarity.
Like their founder, Mozi, the Later Mohists
targeted problems in the Confucian posture as name "rectifiers." They
thought of their study broadly as bian (distinctions) and assumed that
philosophical and ethical disagreements reduced to our having different ways
of using language to cluster and label things. A world-guided approach, they
believed, would give us an objective basis for settling such disagreements.
They rejected an implicit assumption of
rectifying names (that each thing should have only one name appropriate to use
in guiding our action toward it). They noted that many things have more than
one "name" (my horse, Dobbin, is a thing). Confucian rectification
of names addressed the problem of rule conflict by restricting which name was
relevant to action here-now. Mohists argued we should not restrict the
descriptive scope of names, but the scope of compound action descriptions. For
example, a thief is human, but killing a thief (execution) is not (morally)
killing a human (murder).
Their most successful result was a series
of propositions targeting anti-language and anti-distinctions sentiments. They
showed that statements such as "all language is perverse" and "make
no distinctions" are self-condemning. They also argued that in any dispute
revolving around distinctions, one party must be right and one wrong. If we
disagree about the thing over there, one saying it is an ox and the other that
it is not an ox, then one will be right. If they are not disputing about a distinction,
e.g., when one holds it is ox-stuff and the other that it is dog-stuff, then
both could be wrong.
Later Mohism also struggled with a rudimentary
theory of composition, focusing mainly on an analysis of compound terms. Given
the grammar of ancient written Chinese, such compounding seemed the salient
feature of language. They distinguished between two results of compounding terms
that suggested a vague metaphysical distinction. The paradigms of each were
'ox-horse' and 'hard-white'. They held the former to be more inclusive (embraced
two things that did not mix) while the latter was more particular (everywhere
you go you get both).
The School of Names: Gongsun Long and
Hui Shi
The analysis of compounds
led to a notorious debate with one of the figures identified traditionally as
belonging to something called the School of Names. There probably was no school
as such. The two thinkers usually included, Gongsun Long and Hui Shi, seemed
to have held radically different theories and to represent, respectively, a
Confucian and a Daoist analysis of language. Both were likely targeting some
aspect of the Later Mohist theory.
Gongsun Long is most famous for his defense
of the paradoxical claim "White-horse not horse." "White horse"
drew obviously from both Later Mohist compounds–ox-horse and hard-white. Gongsun
Long seemed to want to reduce the two to a single analysis.
The interpretation of the paradox is still
wildly controversial. The traditional view is that his analysis is broadly Platonic.
It holds that Gongsun Long postulated abstractions so the paradox should read
"White-horseness is not horseness." The alternative, concrete interpretation
draws on the mass-like character of Chinese nouns. It holds that Gongsun Long
was arguing for a concrete one-name one-thing analysis, thus "White-horse-stuff
is not horse-stuff."
The other traditional figure from the school
of names, Hui Shi, was a "debating" companion (possibly the teacher)
of the Daoist, Zhuangzi. He concentrated on comparatives and other terms with
obviously relativized reference. So, for example, 'tall' does not have any fixed
range. Tall for a giraffe is not tall for a horse. Generalizing
this feature of relativism in language, Hui Shi apparently concluded no distinctions
or differences rested on external reality. All are projections of different
perspectives. The appropriate conclusion, he thought, was to treat the world
as an absolute one to treat all things as evaluatively equal.
Zhuangzi: Skeptical Relativism
The rediscovery of the Later Mohist analysis confirmed
that Zhuangzi, usually considered a Daoist mystic, was deeply influence by these
various reflections on language. He seems to have appreciated Laozi's
insight that language shapes the patterns of distinctions and valuation that
we normally regard as "natural" or "obvious." He probably
combined Laozi's view with Hui Shi's critique of the perspectival character
most linguistic reference, but without the illegitimate perspective-free claim
that all is one.
This combination led him to a nuanced pluralism
that he reflected in his philosophical style--making most philosophical discussion
take place in dialogues between paradigms of radically different perspectives
(including non-human ones). One advantage of this posture was that it did not
commit him to any self-condemning anti-language conclusion. At the same time,
he could incorporate the Daoist skepticism and distancing from conventional
wisdom and the pretensions of sages to authoritarian insights into The Dao.
His analysis highlighted the role of indexicals
in language--particularly "this" and "that." They do refer
in each instance of use, but what they refer to changes. Anything can be a "this"
in some context and anything can be a "not this." Thus, while agreeing
with the Mohists that objective features influence what terms of a language
pick out, he could note that they do it in an unruly variety of ways. There
seems no limit to the number of ways we might assign terms in choosing things.
Drawing on Hui Shi's argument, Zhuangzi’s
analysis suggests that we apply even 'same' and 'different' perspectivally.
What counts as "the same" from one point of view or purpose would
be "different" from another. He generalized the notion of perspective
to include all the implicit standards behind the bitter dispute between Mohists
and Confucians about which Dao was correct. They say shi 'this/right'
and fei 'not this/wrong' from different perspectives, different starting
points and so the dispute looks irresolvable. Merely persuading someone or getting
someone to agree with your side in such a dispute is not enough to show that
you have made the right bian 'distinction.'
Exactly what substantive position Zhuangzi
offers is open to interpretive dispute. However classifying him as a Daoist
together with accepting a conventional view of Taoism as a version of mystical
or intuitive monism creates a problem. Zhuangzi marshals powerful arguments
against both intuitionism and monism. He shows many signs of a pragmatic analysis
(perhaps drawn from Mohism) of the usefulness of certain kinds of language (including
abiding by ordinary convention).
Especially in view of his detached, fantasy
dialogue style of writing philosophy, the safest conclusion may be that he is
a skeptic, and most likely one who accepts an implicit realist background. There
may be a right way to attach names to things, but we cannot easily decide what
it is. Further, we can never decisively rule out the possibility of a better
way of doing.
Xunzi: Confucian Conventionalism
The final chapter in Chinese language theory comes
in the ‘Rectifying Names’ chapter of the Xunzi. The text focuses on language
because in order to reassert that ritual is the only standard of correct
behavior. It rejects Mencian intuitionism and gleans insights from Zhuangzi
and the dialecticians. The apparent moral it drew was this. Since reality cannot
be a standard of language correctness, the default standard must be convention.
Appeal to the usage of the Sage kings determines
correct name use. The correct account of that usage is a historical tradition
(interpreted, the Xunzi insists, by the judgment of Confucian scholar-gentlemen).
Thus, the text portrays Confucianism as vindicated by the very weakness Mozi
had exposed in launching the philosophical dialectic. The Xunzi goes
on to construct an overtly conventionalist theory of language which carried
political implications.
The Xunzi introduced an important
clarification. It distinguished between two kinds of distinctions: noble-base
and same-different. The former corresponds roughly to value distinctions and
the latter to empirical or descriptive ones. The descriptive distinctions enable
us to interact with other cultures. A king may alter these ‘miscellaneous’ terms.
Even a king, however, should not change conventional evaluative distinctions
(ranks, titles, punishments, or anything in the li (ritual)). For these
we rely on the inherited sage kings’ guide (via the scholar-gentlemen’s interpretation).
The Xunzi regards moral terms as conventional ‘artifice’ arising from
thought, not from nature.
Political authorities rectify names for
the original Confucian purposes (order and obedience). Xunzi’s treats the positions
and paradoxes of the dialecticians in these political terms. Philosophy of language
causes social instability by undermining the public guiding language. Philosophers
confuse the conventional relations of names and make shi-fei (is this/not
this) unclear. This the ruler must prohibit. We must have only one standard
of terminology. The king, not disputing philosophers and warring schools, will
govern introduction of new descriptive terms.
The king should keep three things in mind
as he creates names:
1) the reason for having names:
 The reason for having names is coordinating social behavior and achieving social
order. Hence, value terms govern how we assign descriptive terms.
2) the basis of classifying as similar
and different:
We classify by taking the distinctions delivered by sense organs and using them
according to the dictates of a heart imbued with the correct evaluative distinctions.
3) The essentials of regulating names.
The basis of regulating names is social order and the preservation of a stable,
traditional scheme of language.
Xunzi’s account of classifying similar
and different takes a markedly empirical (epistemological) turn. Unlike the
Mohists, Xunzi did not rely on claims that reality presented objective similarities
and differences. Zhuangzi had argued that human standards of *is this/not this*
were no more natural than the opposing shi/fei ones of other animals.
Taking Zhuangzi’s hint, Xunzi focused on human sense reactions to reality. Indeed,
no neutral, inter-species ways of distinguishing things as similar and different
exist. The senses of one species work differently from those of another, however,
any within one species we find similar distinctions. In humans, these ground
moral conventions.
All humans sense and respond to approximately
the same range of natural distinctions. The eyes of humans distinguish the same
range and bands of colors, the mouth the same range of taste, the ears the same
range and discriminations of pitch, etc. The shared nature of inter-species
distinction-making underwrites the possibility of community and language. Thus,
we abandon appeal to cosmic nature and rely on what is pragmatically possible
for humans in achieving natural human goals.
Our language conventionally clusters some
sensible differences and ignores others. Historical, conventional standards
dictate how it does this. Mastering the inherited, sage king’s scheme of values
transmits these norms into the cultured gentleman’s heart. The heart rules the
sense organs (as it did for Mencius). It determines what range of sensible discriminables
counts to form a category for guiding purposes. Thus the categories mesh with
the moral system of the sage kings and match the clustering they originated.
Clearly the authors of the Xunzi absorbed
a good deal of their contemporary theory of language. It is less clear if they
understood the arguments and motivation. They dispatched the problem of compound
terms by ignoring it. ‘If a single term is sufficient to convey the intent then
use that and otherwise use a compound term.’ The intent, presumably, is the
conventionally understood intent. They do accept the Mohists’ view of names
with varying scopes and disown the one-name-one-thing ideal. The only important
kind of clarity or consistency is the constancy of convention.
The Xunzi treats a number of related
problems about names in sensitive fashion. It views spatial separation as a
basis for describing two things of the same kind as two ‘stuffs.’ Then it defines
*change* as being when a thing’s spatial position does not change (exhibits
characteristic continuity) and its type does. We then treat it as the same thing
that has changed characteristics. This discussion of metamorphosis is the closest
approximation to the classical Western problem of change.
Whether or not the Xunzi group understood
the theories behind the paradoxes they criticize, They clearly did not approve
of them. The text exhibits neither philosophical fascination with solving conceptual
puzzles for their own sake nor using them to drive theory. He criticizes paradoxical
statements on primarily political grounds--the deleterious social effects of
asserting their conclusions. Each of them upsets conventional ways of using
terms. Its solution is political not intellectual--ban them!
The Xunzi classifies the paradoxes
into three groups that vaguely suggests the line of thought leading to them.
Each it argues, violates one of the three insights into names. The reason for
naming is coordinating behavior, so paradoxes which ‘use names to confuse names’
include the Mohist’s claim that ‘killing thieves is not killing men.’ It uses
a theory of names to yield a conclusion that sounds unconventional. So we forbid
saying them.
The second set is ‘use reality to confuse
names’ and the central examples are Hui Shi’s relativity paradoxes. They
ignore the shared human empirical basis for assigning similarity and difference
and use the fact that having different perspectives on reality might lead us
to saying unconventional things about size and shape. So the king will forbid
saying them.
The final group uses names to confuse reality
and includes ‘White Horse not Horse.’ His analysis does not help resolve the
interpretive puzzles about the line of reasoning since it addresses only the
pragmatic consequences of allowing such theorizing. His solution, once again,
is for the king to avoid and prevent such distracting sophistry.
The Aftermath: Death of Philosophy
One of Xunzi’s students
was a minor royal in one of the warring states. He became a central figure of
a school called Legalists. He had learned a smattering of Chinese theory of
language. He exaggerated the threat of interpretative anarchy to justify repressing
philosophy and language creativity entirely.
He followed Xunzi’s argument that the ruler
should enforce uniformity in language but rejected using a scholarly tradition
as the norm. His based his theory of regulation and punishment on a crude argument
about shape and name. It takes us back to the unexplained Confucian notion that
names by themselves guide action. An official post is a capsule description
of function (duties) the holder should perform. Hanfeizi never says how. In
the light of recent discoveries, this doctrine appears to be an application
of the doctrine of a cult of ruler worship (Huang-Lao). It taught that the dao
(guide) was in nature and names were embedded in natural shapes.
Legalism became the official doctrine of
the repressive Qin empire that brought the Classical period of Chinese philosophy
to an abrupt halt. In the aftermath, the insights Chinese theory of language
slipped into obscurity. Huang-Lao became the dominant theory surviving during
China’s philosophical Dark Age until the importation of Buddhist theory. The
early Medieval Daoist interpreters argued that we can have names only for things
we see. Suppression had worked its magic!
Glossary
«D
fei
(not, not-this, or wrong)
¸Ü
hua
(speech or vernacular)
¤¯
jen
(humanity or benevolence)
§
li
(rites)
¦W
ming
(names)
ÅG
pien
(distinction or disagreement)
¬O
shih
(this or right)
¬O «D
shih-fei
(is-is not, this-not this or right-wrong)
¤Ñ
t’ien
(heaven, nature or sky)
¹D
tao
(way or guide)
¤å
wen
(literature, writing, or culture)
ª«
wu
(thing or thing-kind)
µL ©R
wu-ming
(lack fate)
¨¥
yen
(language or words)
¦³ ©R
yu-ming
(have fate)
¦³ µL
yu-wu
(have-lack or being-non-being)
Reading List
Bao, Zhiming. 1990 "Language and World View in Ancient China," Philosophy
East and West Vol XL, No. 2 pp. 195-210.
Chao, Y. R.. 1955 "Notes on Chinese Grammar and Logic," Philosophy
East and West 5/1 pp. 31-41.
Graham, Angus. 1978 Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong
and London: Chinese University Press) .
Hansen, Chad. 1983 Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press) .
Hansen, Chad. May 1985 "Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy, and 'Truth',"
Journal of Asian Studies Vol XLIV, No. 3 pp. 491-519.
Hansen, Chad. 1992 A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford
University Press)
Hansen, Chad. March 1993 "Chinese Ideographs and Western Ideas,"
Journal of Asian Studies 52/2 pp. 373-399.
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