Dictionary of the History of Ideas    THEODICYI. DEFINITION OF THEODICYIt is generally agreed that the term “theodicy” (inFrench théodicée), formed from two Greek words, Θεός(“God”) and δίκη (“justice”), was devised by Leibnizlate in the seventeenth century. From his youth Leibnizhad habitually used the phrase “the justice of God”in discussing the problem of evil, but the term“theodicy” appears late in the 1690's. Having beentrained in the law, Leibniz regarded theology itself asthe highest form of jurisprudence, and consequentlytreated the problem of God's relation to the evils ofthe world after the analogy of a case at court. It wasthe widespread popularity of his Essais de théodicée... (1710, hereafter referred to as Theodicy) whichbrought the term into general use. Page 379, Volume 4Theodicy in its narrow sense is thus the defense ofGod, the supreme creator, ruler, and judge of theuniverse, against charges brought about by a consid-eration of both moral and natural evil. Leibniz himselfexemplified this meaning in a short treatise written asa quasi-legal brief, and published independently in thesame year as the Theodicy: The Cause of God arguedin Terms of His Justice (Causa Dei asserta per justitiameius).Linked to this meaning, however, is a second one—the philosophical study of the compatibility of evil withthe idea of God. Thus Leibniz, writing to Des Bosses(Feb. 5, 1712; trans. Loemker, p. 601), defined theodicyas “a kind of science, as it were, namely the doctrineof the justice of God—that is, of his wisdom togetherwith his goodness.” A theodicy in this sense shouldexamine the interrelationships of three concepts: thenature of God and his providence, the nature of evil,and the meaning of justice.Since these concepts require further presuppositionsas broad as the field of natural theology itself, a third,broader meaning of theodicy has arisen; it has becomea synonym for philosophical theology. Grounds for thisuse of the term may also be found in Leibniz himself,since his Theodicy, the only inclusive philosophicalwork which he published during his lifetime (1646-1716), contained wide perspectives on his whole systemof thought. Christian Wolff established this wider useof the term, and the Scholastic tradition has generallyfollowed it. In the reform of the French educationalsystem carried through in the early nineteenth century,the year course in philosophy of the Lycée was dividedinto four sections: psychology, logic, morals, andtheodicy (or natural theology). This usage is retainedin P. Janet and G. Seailles, L'Histoire de la philosophie:les problèmes et les écoles (Paris, 1887; II, Part iv).II. THEODICY IN HISTORICAL RELIGIONSIn the narrow and proper sense of the term,theodicies can arise only in traditions of ethical theism.The problem presupposes the existence of one Godwith a moral character engaged in the order of theworld, although a polytheism in which the gods arethemselves bound by a superior moral fate, or one inwhich the religious loyalty of the individual or thegroup is restricted to one god (henotheism) also mayraise the question of justice in the face of persistentevil. However, polytheism, the pantheism of a monisticabsolute, and the dualism which assigns the evil to agod or demon apart from the good provide ways ofavoiding the problem of theodicy altogether.Nevertheless, complaints about the actions of thereligious being or beings upon whom the values of lifedepend but who have permitted evil occur wherever man has faced his life with self-consciousness. In thefirst chapter of his book on prayer (1932) FriedrichHeiler has pointed out complaints, protests, andattempts to coerce, in the face of undeserved sufferings,in the traditions of many ancient or tribal cultures. Inancient China the question of the cause of sufferingwas addressed to Shang Ti, the Highest Lord. Themystical pantheism of the Vedanta in India evadedthe problem through identity with the One, but in themore personalistic mysticism of the Bhagavad-Gita thedialogue between Krishna and Arguna includes areproach for the evil in the world which is answeredby the god. Although the Buddha was skeptical aboutthe gods, the content of his enlightenment concernedthe fact of evil, its subjective cause, and its resolution.Though polytheistic, the religions of the Mesopotamianriver civilizations anticipate a doctrine that is firmlyentrenched in the history of the Hebrews, and stillprevails in the orthodox theistic faiths historically de-rivative from this—the conviction that there is adivinely appointed equation of suffering with sin andof reward with loyalty. As Saint Augustine expressedit, “There are two kinds of evil—sin and the penaltyfor sin” (Against Fortunatus, 15; in Earlier Writings).It deserves notice, however, that the Hebrew scripturesalso contain the great poetic refutation of this theoryof evil as retribution—the book of Job, which alsomakes the point that the only resolution of the problemis in the realm of personal commitment or faith. Alsoreflected in later books of the Hebrew canon, as wellas in early Christian heresies, is the dualism of gods—good and evil—adhered to in the religion of Iran.In Greece the highly individualized natures of thegods render the problem of theodicy meaningless, forthe society of gods is almost at one with the societyof men, and human responses must be adjusted tothem very much as they must be adjusted to other,admittedly more powerful, humans. But in the greatmyths, particularly as they are treated in Greek trag-edy, the gods fade into insignificance in the face ofthe awesome powers and harsh sufferings common tothe human situation, and the treatment of themes suchas pride and retribution achieves a universal humansignificance.Thus there have arisen in all religious considerationsof evil, both moral and natural, certain lines of thoughtdemanding a theodicy or suggesting ways of avoidingone: by rendering evil subjective, to be overcome bythe discipline of thought and will; by a dualism orpluralism of good and evil forces; by making sufferinga retribution for sin; by overcoming the distinctionbetween good and evil through mystical identificationwith God, so that what is, is good; or by a nonunder-standing commitment of faith to the goodness of God Page 380, Volume 4and to justification in a life after death. The groundis thus prepared for a philosophical theodicy.III. PHILOSOPHICAL THEODICIES1. Greek Theodicy. The first philosophical resolutionof the problem of evil is found in the dualism of theearly cosmologists, which separated the good from thebad—a separation which was retained by Plato andAristotle, however much these may have shifted thereference of the two poles. In each case, whether inAnaximander's separation of bounded order fromunbounded matter (apeiron), or the Pythagoreans'dualism of even and odd, or Plato's and Aristotle'sdistinction between form and matter, the two areassigned distinct metaphysical statuses, even though thelatter, the evil, is in some way subordinate or subjectto the former, the good. In Heraclitus, on the otherhand, and the Stoics, who appropriated his theory ofthe eternal logos-fire, the two poles are absorbed intoa unity which transcends both but is in some higherway good, requiring submission by the individual tothis ultimate order which determines his destiny. Tooversimplify somewhat, the philosophic tendency is toresolve the problem of evil, either through a dualismin which the good is free of evil yet controls it, orthrough a pantheism in which evil is somehow less realand existent than the “truly” good, though inseparablefrom the apparent good. The two movements are fullysynthesized by Plotinus and those who follow him;following both the Stoic doctrine of the One and thelogic of a hierarchical scale of being, Plotinus makesmatter the source of evil, but places it also at the outerextreme of nonbeing, removed from the One, theineffable source of all goodness and harmony. In everycase, evil is either reducible to some source other thanthe good (dualism), or it is merely a limitation of thegood (negation), and the problem of a theodicy (whichinvolves culpability of the good) is avoided.In the Hellenistic period, however, there were twodistinct approaches to a theodicy, which establishedprecedents for later discussions. One was the challengewhich Epicurus directed at God's power or goodness.According to Lactantius (A Treatise on the Anger ofGod, Ch. 13) he reasoned as follows:God either wishes to take away evils and is unable; or heis able and is unwilling; or he is neither willing nor able;or he is both willing and able. If he is willing but unablehe is feeble, which is not in accordance with the characterof God. If he is able and unwilling, he is envious, whichis equally at variance with God. If he is neither willingnor able, he is both envious and feeble, and therefore notGod. If he is both willing and able, which alone is suitablefor God, from what source then are evils? Or why does henot remove them? The argument has been repeated by skeptics untiltoday and various consequences drawn from it; onepossibility, of course, is Epicurean deism or atheism.The second contribution to a theodicy in late classi-cism is Plutarch's criticism of the Stoic ethics of obedi-ence to the universal reason governing the world, onthe charge that Stoicism makes God the source of allevils (De Stoicarum repugnantiis, Secs. 32-37; thecriticism is levelled against Chrysippus, Treatise on theGods). Plutarch's own solution is Plato's; God cannotbe identified with nature as the Stoics hold; God canonly be good, and evil must have some other source,whether in lesser powers or in matter.2. Christianity and Saint Augustine. It is only whenthe Western theistic religions, all of them influencedby the Hebrew scriptures and by Greek thought, seeka clarification and defense of faith in the face ofpaganism and heresy that the problem of theodicybecomes vital. The retributive theory of suffering re-mains strong in these faiths, although protests were asold as the Book of Job and the teachings of Jesus andPaul. The eschatological hope of a final judgment andpromise of eternal life with rewards for the faithfuland good, and punishment for sinners, was the ultimatejustification of a moral world order. But the questionsof why a creator of perfect power, wisdom, and good-ness can create a world containing evil, and how hisforeknowledge is compatible with human freedom,developed as foci for discussion. A tough-mindedorthodoxy (Tertullian, for example) turned to theparadoxes of the gospel as justification for theoreticalskepticism and an affirmation of faith in the impossible.But, for most thinkers, Platonism provided an antidotefor doubt and for the dualistic heresies of Gnostic andManichee. A universe which is the creation of a perfectbeing must, to adequately reflect his greatness, be asfull as possible of all degrees of finite goodness andthus also contain levels of evil as their negation; insuch a world, Greek thought supports revelation inholding man to be free and therefore capable of evil,yet destined also to find his way from the lower levelof sense and matter to the higher level of grace.It was Saint Augustine who, after passing throughManichaean and Neo-Platonic phases of thought, pro-vided that complex synthesis of doctrines about eviland the justification of God which came to prevail inWestern Christian orthodoxy; it was adapted byThomas Aquinas to the Scholastic tradition and byLeibniz to the context of the modern scientific andrationalistic moods.Augustine's theodicy is eclectic and resists sys-tematization. He modified Plotinus' theory of evil asnegation by making it a matter rather of privation—in each created being that is evil which deprives it Page 381, Volume 4of the particular form or purpose which is natural toit. To this must be added Augustine's concern aboutthe inwardness of experience, the motive rather thanthe external consequence of action. Evil is deficiency,therefore no cause can be found for it (City of GodXII, 7). Hence evil has no independent status; it isalways parasitic on the good (Enchiridion, Chs. 13, 14).But since being and goodness must be defined in termsof the particular final cause inherent in each createdbeing, only free creatures can experience evil.When the will abandons what is above itself and turns towhat is lower, it becomes evil, not because that to whichit turns is evil, but because the turning itself is wicked(Cityof God XII, 6).So man's fall brought evil into the world, and it isrelative to man and to other free creatures.To this theory of evil as privation, Augustine addsanalogical arguments of an aesthetic and part-wholenature. What appears to be evil seen in isolation orin too narrow context could be seen as a necessarycomponent in a larger context. Thus evil can be under-stood in relation to good as ugliness stands to beauty;it provides the contrast (darkness, disharmony) whichlets the good (light, harmony) stand out more brightlyand perfectly. Thus death, to which everything tran-sitory is subject, itself enhances the degrees of perfec-tion in creation. Likewise the atonement provides acompletely just balance for sin, preserving the harmonyand goodness of the whole.The wide range of arguments by which Augustinesought to exonerate God from any charge of moral ormetaphysical imperfection and to derive all evil fromman's sin were the foundation for theological optimismin the first centuries of the modern world. ThomasAquinas used both his theory of privation and theso-called aesthetic argument, and although there weredepartures from it in such Scholastics as Ockham, itestablished the tradition of philosophical theology.(Summa Theologica I, 4-49; On Free Will III, 9, 26.)The theory that evil is necessary to the total goodbecause it serves as discipline to the moral and spirituallife is neglected in Augustine, but has been traced toanother church father, Irenaeus, by John Hick in Eviland the God of Love (1966). The “Irenaean type oftheodicy,” also indebted to aspects of Platonism, holdsthat the evils of the world are required by a God oflove who seeks the development of his free creaturesfrom their original innocence into full spiritual beings.Hence, as in Augustine, there is no intrinsic or surdevil; evil is justified as the means of developing manfrom bondage to self-conscious participation in theKingdom of God. This disciplinary view, which Hicksargues was eclipsed by the Augustinian arguments, was revived after Kant by Schleiermacher and others, andfound support in theistic interpretations of evolutionin the nineteenth century.3. Theodicy in the Reformation and Leibniz. In thetheological conflicts of the Reformation another criticalreaction to the Augustinian theodicy developed. BothLuther and Calvin followed Augustine's doctrine thatall evils follow from the sin and fall of man. But Lutherin particular, in the tradition of voluntarism, stressingfaith as independent of reason, repudiated the entireconception of a philosophical theodicy on fideisticgrounds. Not God is to be justified, but man. To raisethe speculative question of a theodicy merely revealsthe entire sinful condition of man. Only faith has theassurance that God will use the evil of the world forhis own ends. Faith exceeds our present understandingas does the justice of God in accepting sinners.This skepticism of the intellect, which shifts theproblem of theodicy from philosophy to revelation andfaith, is, of course, as old as Job, and has continueduntil now, in the Neo-Orthodoxy of our times (KarlBarth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, Munich [1932], Vol. 3,Parts 1-3). But theological controversy made inevitablea revival of metaphysics and natural theology, particu-larly the Neo-Platonic view that evil becomes mean-ingful in the larger and higher context of the purposeof creation. Nicholas of Cusa argued that since allcreation is an image of the divine, the world is as goodas it possibly could be, given its status as contingentand finite (De ludo globi, I). In the argument for thegoodness of the world, teleological or “physico-theological” arguments eventually assume a priorityover the other traditional forms, so that by the seven-teenth century nature has been freed from the curseof Adam, and its newly discovered mathematical andorganic harmonies appear as empirical evidence forthe justice of God. The preoccupation of the earlyBoyle Lectures with teleological considerations marksa high point of this development.The defense of God against the attacks of atheistsand “libertines” was a prominent concern of thinkersof the seventeenth century, and the problem of man'sfreedom in its relation to God's omniscience and powerbecame an important issue in the theodicic argument.In his apologetic work, left incomplete as the Pensées,Pascal attributed evil to man's sin, to be overcome bythe redeemed in mystical revelation through faith.Spinoza, by contrast, had exonerated God from bothgood and evil, these being relative to what is usefulor harmful to man, and capable of being understoodthrough an adequate grasp of God and the activeemotions which arise from this.Like Spinoza, Leibniz had a sharp sense of the realityof the problem of evil, particularly the historical evils Page 382, Volume 4which beset Europe. The task of theodicy was thereforeto show that the reality of evil is compatible with,indeed, follows from, the creation and providence ofa God whose attributes are perfections. In addition tothe great Theodicy of 1710, he wrote many brieferones, including “Von der Allmacht und AllwissenheitGottes und der Freiheit des Menschen” (“Of theOmnipotence and Omniscience of God and the Free-dom of Man”); from the early Paris years the Confessiophilosophi (“Confession of a Philosopher,” edited byI. Jagodinski, Kazan [1915]); the Discours de la méta-physique (“Discourse on Metaphysics,” 1686), espe-cially section 30 (Wiener, pp. 331-34); and the CausaDie, already mentioned. To the Theodicy, writtendiscursively for a wide circle of readers, he added asan appendix, an “Abridgment of the Argument Re-duced to Syllogistic Form” (the Abrégé, Gerhardt VI,376-87; trans. Wiener, pp. 509-22), which set thearguments against God in twelve syllogisms, andrefuted them in counter-syllogisms—a logical processwhich Hume and Kant adopted in their refutations.Leibniz repeated, in general, the Augustinian-Thomistic arguments, with some adaptations to fit hisanalytic logic of propositions, his monadic theory ofsubstance, and a quasi-mathematical conception of theprinciple that of all possible events, the best possiblealways occurs. His analysis is aided by clear definitionsof justice (as the love of the wise man), of freedomas self-determination, and of will, anticipatory andconsequent. As Thomas had done before him, hediscusses three kinds of evil: metaphysical, moral, andnatural. Metaphysical evil is essentially finiteness orprivation in the law of individual natures. Moral evilor sin is real; it is based on unclear and inadequateknowledge; and God, who determined the law of eachindividual nature as the best possible in itself and inthe harmony of the whole universe, is not responsiblefor it. Natural evil is determined by laws which alsodefine the best possible consequences. Thus in everycase evil must be judged teleologically in terms of thebest possible whole. God is justified because evils areused to achieve greater goods than would otherwisebe possible; evil historical events are processes ofretrenchment and of the clearing of obstacles for abetter future (reculer pour mieux sauter); on the samegrounds suffering is justified as retribution for evilactions. The indestructibility of the monads is theassurance of an immortality in which the greatestharmony and justice will continue to be achieved. Sincetruths of fact lie beyond the range of any finite analysis,we cannot now completely comprehend the place ofany event in the total harmony.4. Criticisms of Theodicy in the Enlightenment andin Kant. The wide influence of the Theodicy is shown not only in the spirit of intellectual optimism of theEnlightenment, but also in the clarity and depth ofthe criticisms which it evoked. In spite of the harshconflicts between Newtonians and Leibnizians, SamuelClarke's Boyle Lectures show a great agreement onteleological and theological principles. Pope's Essayon Man is widely regarded as having been influencedby the Theodicy, perhaps through conversations withBolingbroke. Appearing in many editions in France,Leibniz' work supported a popular optimism whichVoltaire, stirred by the destructive fury of the Lisbonearthquake, satirized in Candide and helped to dispel.It was this theological current whose logic Humeexposed with relentless analysis in the Dialogues con-cerning Natural Religion (1779); in it Philo statesEpicurus' old dilemma in the simplified form (it cannotbe true, both that evil exists, and that God is bothomnipotent and perfectly good) in which the problemof theodicy has recently been revived.Immanuel Kant criticized all previous attempts ata theodicy in his short essay “Ueber das Misslingenaller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee” (“Onthe Failure of All Philosophical Attempts at aTheodicy”). It was written in 1791, after the threeCritiques but before his work on “Religion within theLimits of mere Reason.” In his precritical period hehad still been intent upon settling the “distinctness ofthe fundamental principles of natural theology andmorals” by placing teleology at the center of his argu-ment. Now, having placed the problems of theologybeyond the range of theoretical reason, establishing theprimacy of the practical reason and the moral law,defining its postulates, and, finally, reconciling the twothrough teleological judgments involving feelings ofperfection, he applies these insights in a revision ofthe problem of theodicy in a style reminiscent ofLeibniz' Causa Dei..., not only in its syllogisticstructure of defense and rebuttal, but in his tripartiteordering of the divine attributes: goodness, omniscienceand omnipotence, and holiness. These, he holds, mustbe challenged by the empirical fact of disteleology oranti-purpose (Zweckwidrigkeit). Moral anti-purpose(das Böse) refutes will as means; physical anti-purpose(Evil) refutes will as end; and a third anti-purpose, thedisproportion of physical suffering to moral evil, refutesthe holiness of God's justice. Hence all previoustheodicies, resting upon the intellect, have failed.Yet there is the demand for cosmic justice, withinadequate support from experience, and Kant pro-poses that “more effective grounds may be found,which will absolve the wisdom which has facedaccusation, not ab instantia since we can never becertain that our reason can arrive at the insight throughexperience alone of the relationship in which the world Page 383, Volume 4stands to the highest wisdom” (Academy ed., VIII, 263).Following the insight of Job's triumph over his friends,he finds these grounds not through speculative wisdomnor through moral wisdom alone, though both assureus of the possibility of a teleology, but through “truth-fulness” (Wahrhaftigkeit)—not truth, which is un-available—and a sense of moral uprightness and formalconscientiousness. This is not a simple justificationthrough faith, but through the cosmic demands implicitin the moral uprightness of the individual, which arepossible but not justifiable theoretically.5. Theodicies after Kant. Kant's emphasis upon theinward, moral basis of theodicy had lasting conse-quences upon followers and opponents alike. The in-tense moralism of Fichte is shown in his view thatnature is the battle-ground on which man achievesfreedom. Condemning Leibniz for undertaking atheodicy with “indeterminate abstract categories,”Hegel finds one in history. At the conclusion of hisPhilosophy of History he wrote, “That the history ofthe world is this process of development and the actualcoming-into-being of spirit, underneath the variabledramas of its histories—this is the true theodicy, thejustification of God in history” (Glockner ed., 11, 569;see also 11, 42). The attainment of freedom in the state,and the process of self-conscious assimilation by menof the absolute justify the sufferings of history. Leaningupon Hegel's dialectical logic, later Hegelians showedthat this was a return to the Neo-Platonic theory thatevil is a more complete good seen partially. (See alsoJosiah Royce, for instance, in Studies in Good and Evil[1898], passim.)Another type of post-Kantian inversion of the prob-lem of theodicy is found in the work of the Frenchpersonalist, Henry Duméry, author of The Problem ofGod in Philosophy of Religion (Evanston, 1964), whoreflects also the influence of such Kant-inspired thinkersas Henri Bergson and Nicholas Berdyaev. God cannotbe objectified; to find the answer to the place of evilwe must discover the immanence of God as thetranscendent unity, the radical spontaneity, the powerto change, within man. The internal dialogue of theperson with the absolute within him is the path to theresolution of evil and the vindication of God. This isKant with some Bergsonian support.In the nineteenth century there were other attemptsto overcome the problem of theodicy by reinterpretingthe nature of God. Scientism absolved nature from allgood or bad, and the growth of social injustices andconcern for their reform emphasized moral evil andhuman responsibility rather than the justice of God.The conception of a God perfectly good but withoutabsolute power was revived with effectiveness by JohnStuart Mill, William James, E. S. Brightman, and others, who thus vacated the theodicy problem ratherthan solved it. Darwin's theory of evolution intensifiedthe meaning of evil in nature by stressing the role ofstruggle, but also invited a positive but hardly justifiedargument by the Social Darwinists that nature supportsprogress and the improvement of forms of life.Thinkers like R. A. Tsanoff have found natural evil toarise from the disharmonies and disturbed relationswhich take place between old and new orders of life,while Henderson and others offered statistical evidenceof a teleological principle in nature. Thus encouraged,theistic and idealistic thinkers revived the Irenaeiantheodicy, holding that evil and freedom are thedivinely chosen conditions by which men are disci-plined to become members of the Kingdom of God.In the face of the great moral and historical catas-trophes of this century, and the decline of philosophicaltheology which accompanied them, the problem oftheodicy has been largely absorbed through the riseof religious humanism, or a fideism which distrustsintellect, or a secular skepticism. Yet there is renewedevidence that the problem is still alive, in recent dis-cussions by thinkers of an analytic type who haverestored and given rigorous formulation to the objec-tions of Hume and Kant, with what must be admittedto be still inconclusive results. Since these discussionsmove from the question of theodicy to the questionof evidence for the existence of God, they need notbe discussed here. The works by Hick, Flew andMacIntyre, and Pike listed in the Bibliography willintroduce the reader to these recent studies.BIBLIOGRAPHYSaint Augustine, Earlier Writings, trans. J. H. S. Burleigh(London and Philadelphia, 1953); idem, The City of God,trans. Marcus Dods (New York, 1948; also reprint), esp. Book12. E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York,1940). Karl Barth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik (Munich, 1932),English trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh, 1958), Vol. III.Henry Duméry, The Problem of God in Philosophy of Reli-gion, trans. C. Courtney (Evanston, 1964). A. Flew andA. MacIntyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology(London, 1955). G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, ed. HermannGlockner, 26 vols. (Stuttgart, 1927-40). Friedrich Heiler,Prayer: A Study in the History and Psychology of Religion,ed. S. McComb and J. E. Park (London and New York, 1932).L. J. Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment (Boston,1958). John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London, 1966);see also an abridged summary, “Evil,” Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (New York, 1967), III, 136-41. David Hume,Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1779).R. Jolivet, “Evil,” New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York,1967), V, 665-67. Karl Jung, Antwort auf Hiob (Zurich,1952); trans. K. F. C. Hull as Answer to Job (London, 1954).I. Kant, Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche Page 384, Volume 4in der Theodizee, in Gesammelte Schriften, 23 vols. (Berlin,1902-55), VIII, 253-72. Lactantius, A Treatise on the Angerof God, trans. William Fletcher (Edinburgh, 1871). G. W.Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols.(Berlin, 1875-90); idem, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe,published by the German Academy, formerly the PrussianAcademy (Darmstadt and Berlin, 1923—; still incomplete),these are the most useful editions; idem, Essais de théodicéesur la bonté de dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine dumal (1710); trans. E. M. Haggard as Essays on the Goodnessof God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil (London,1951). Unfortunately Haggard omitted from his translationthe important appendices: Leibniz' reduction of his argu-ment to syllogistic form is translated in the Leibniz Selec-tions, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York, 1951; 1959), pp.509-22; The Philosophical Papers and Letters of Leibniz, ed.L. E. Loemker, rev. ed. (Dordrecht, 1969) contains earlyattempts at the problem (pp. 146-47, 216-27, 321-23).J. S. Mill, Three Essays on Religion (London, 1874); idem, AnExamination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (London,1865), Ch. VII. Nelson Pike, ed., God and Evil: Readingsin the Theological Problem of Evil (Englewood Cliffs, 1964).Josiah Royce, Studies in Good and Evil (New York, 1898).F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology (Cambridge, 1930),Vol. II, Ch. viii. R. A. Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil (NewYork, 1931).LEROY E. LOEMKER[See also Evil v2-19 ; Existentialism v2-22 ; Free Will in Theology v2-29 ; God v2-39 v2-40 v2-41 ;Hegelian... v2-46 ; Perennial Philosophy. v3-56 ]The Dictionary of the History of IdeasElectronic Text CenterPO Box 400148Charlottesville VA 22904-4148434.924.3230 | fax: 434.924.1431Maintained by: The Electronic Text Centerat the University of Virginia Library© 2003 the Gale GroupAll Rights ReservedLast Modified: Thursday, May 1, 2003 |
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